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What can the philosophy of science contribute to the 
ethics of science and technology?
Márcio Rojas da Cruz 1, Gabriele Cornelli 2
Abstract
Born to enable its creators to fulfill their needs, scientific technique has always played a significant role in 
human civilization. This is the context in which we glimpse the advent of modern technoscience, which has 
significantly contributed to the increment of human control over nature. This study aims to analyze, under 
the focus of bioethics, reflections on the philosophy of science as they relate to the neutrality of science and 
converge with epistemic rationality, as well as to relate those reflections to the process of making decisions 
in the administration of technoscience. The study has raised doubts about the capacity of technoscientific 
knowledge to legitimize and justify the decisions within the ambit of the national science and technology 
systems, thus signaling the need for promoting a link between technoscientific self-regulation and bioethic 
hetero-regulation.
Keywords: Bioethics. Knowledge. Science. Science, technology and society.
Resumo
O que pode a filosofia da ciência contribuir para a ética da ciência e tecnologia?
Nascida para permitir que seus criadores possam atender suas próprias necessidades, a técnica científica 
sempre desempenhou papel significativo na civilização humana. Este é o contexto em que podemos vis-
lumbrar o advento da tecnociência moderna, que tem contribuído significativamente para o incremento do 
controle humano sobre a natureza. Este estudo tem por objetivo analisar, sob o enfoque da bioética, reflexões 
sobre como a filosofia da ciência entende a neutralidade da ciência e sua convergência com a racionalidade 
epistêmica, bem como relacionar essas reflexões ao processo de tomada de decisões na administração da 
tecnociência. O estudo levantou dúvidas sobre a capacidade do conhecimento tecnocientífico para legitimar 
e justificar as decisões no âmbito dos sistemas de ciência e tecnologia nacionais, sinalizando assim a necessi-
dade de promover ligação entre a auto-regulação tecnocientífico e hetero-regulação bioética.
Palavras-chave: Bioética. Conhecimento. Ciência. Ciência, tecnologia e sociedade.
Resumen
¿En qué puede contribuir la filosofía de la ciencia a la ética de la ciencia y la tecnología?
Nacida para permitir a sus creadores satisfacer sus necesidades, la técnica científica siempre ha desempeñado 
un papel importante en la civilización humana. Este es el contexto en el que se vislumbra el advenimiento de 
la tecnociencia moderna, la cual ha contribuido significativamente al incremento del control humano sobre 
la naturaleza. Este estudio tiene como objetivo analizar, bajo el enfoque de la bioética, reflexiones acerca de 
cómo la filosofía de la ciencia entiende a la neutralidad de la ciencia y a su convergencia con la racionalidad 
epistémica, así como relacionar estas reflexiones con el proceso de toma de decisiones en la administración 
de la tecnociencia. El estudio ha puesto en duda la capacidad del conocimiento tecnocientífico para legitimar 
y justificar las decisiones en el ámbito de los sistemas nacionales de ciencia y tecnología, señalando así la 
necesidad de promover un vínculo entre la autorregulación tecnocientífica y la hetero-regulación bioética.
Palabras-clave: Bioética. Conocimiento. Ciencia. Ciencia, tecnología y sociedad.
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On a certain occasion Popper registered his 
agreement with Russell regarding epistemolo-
gy’s practical consequences for science itself, as 
well as for ethics and politics. Popper and Russell 
agreed to draw both epistemological relativism 
and epistemological pragmatism closer to totali-
tarian and authoritarian ideas 1. Based on Popper’s 
and Russell’s view of the proximity between epis-
temological relativism/epistemological pragmatism 
and totalitarian/authoritarian ideas, we propose 
to approach the philosophy of science in order to 
elucidate the practical consequences that could be 
drawn from its contributions to epistemology.
We have been following the remarkable sci-
entific advances of recent years, particularly those 
concerning the biotechnoscientific paradigm. 
Made possible by Darwin’s theory of evolution and 
Mendel’s genetic theory, and brought into being by 
Watson and Crick’s elucidation of the structure of 
DNA and by the subsequent development of genetic 
engineering protocols (with restriction enzymes, 
DNA ligases, DNA polymerases, chain reactions, 
etc), the biotechnoscientific paradigm represents 
our technical competence for transforming and re-
programming the natural environment, other living 
beings and oneself according to one’s plans and 
wishes 2, allowing us in theory to become, in a way, 
immune to the mechanisms of natural selection and 
the other significant factors influencing the process 
of evolution of living species 3.
It is noteworthy that this sometimes surprising 
potential had already been pointed out by Popper 
himself when, reflecting upon scientific progress in 
general, he realized that from an evolutional and 
biological point of view science is an instrument 
used by the human species to adapt to the environ-
ment, to invade new environmental niches and even 
to create new environmental niches 4.
In this context we are confronted by the fol-
lowing issue: scientific undertaking grants us an 
exclusively technical a priori competence, but 
not necessarily an ethical competence. A signifi-
cant proportion of products and processes which 
adhere strictly to the biotechnoscientific paradigm 
raise ethical dilemmas which cannot be resolved in 
even a minimally satisfactory way without exhaus-
tive studies and discussions. We cannot, therefore, 
evade our responsibility to evaluate the ethical and 
moral consequences of modern scientific actions.
Scientific and technological progress, which 
together offer the prospect of definitively solving 
the most diverse problems (health, social, environ-
mental, etc.), have also allowed modern society the 
development of an articulated process of mythifica-
tion of the practice of science itself.
For Feyerabend, a myth is a system of thought, 
imposed and preserved through indoctrination, 
which offers explanations about reality according 
to facts which correspond to elements of so-called 
common sense, and also possesses the character-
istic of infallibility 5. Scientific theory, on the other 
hand, is a system of thought with counterintuitive 
and counter-inductive general explanations which 
are arrived at by the most brilliant thinkers. How-
ever, since scientific theory is essentially a human 
achievement, it has the characteristic of fallibility 6-7. 
The lack of clarity between the defining properties 
and the consequent limitations of a scientific theory, 
confusing itself with the conception of a myth, ends 
up allowing the possibility to perceive science as a 
myth, creating the risk that possible mistakes and 
negative effects in modern scientific activity might 
be neglected.
It is relevant to point out that the prevailing 
conception of scientific knowledge, which is exclu-
sively focused on methodological and epistemic 
justification – the mythified image of scientific en-
deavors – is liable to create an asymmetry between 
science on one side and moral and political aspects 
on the other, with the corollary of creating a hierar-
chy in which epistemic values take priority positions 
to the detriment of political and ethical values. In 
this context the issue of “epistemic authoritari-
anism” arises, characterized by the ideology that 
scientific knowledge is not only a necessary condi-
tion but is also sufficient to justify and legitimate 
political decisions 8.
This study will therefore aim to relate the 
neutrality of science and convergence on epistemic 
rationality to ethics in science and technology. Spe-
cifically, we will reflect upon the contribution of Karl 
R. Popper, Thomas S. Kuhn and Paul K. Feyerabend’s 
philosophy of science to the fundamental as-
sumptions of scientific activity in its interface with 
bioethics.
It’s noteworthy that the discussions par-
ticularly related to scientific neutrality and the 
convergence on epistemic rationality are funda-
mental to the reflection concerning the bioethical 
management of technoscientific systems. This cen-
trality is a consequence of the fact that scientific 
neutrality is the main argument in defense of total 
scientific autonomy, prescinding any type of regula-
tion other than autoregulation, bestowing a sort of 
“immunity” or “privilege” on the exercise of scientif-
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As for the convergence on epistemic rationality, on 
the other hand, the centrality emerges because it is 
the main argument in defense of the sufficiency of 
opinions and recommendations based on scientific 
knowledge on matters that aim to settle contentions 
of various orders, endowing scientific speech with a 
sort of “superiority” that would make its “exclusivi-
ty” acceptable.
Popperian propositions
I disbelieve in specialization and in experts. By paying 
too much respect to the specialist, we are destroying 
the commonwealth of learning, the trationalist tra-
dition, and science itself  9. 
Let us first elucidate in the most precise way 
possible the practical consequences, within the 
ambit of bioethics, of Popper’s contributions to the 
philosophy of science. The first point regards ethi-
cal principles as the search for truth and the ideas 
of intellectual honesty and fallibility, such principles 
forming part of the very basis of science 10. Without 
meaning to belittle these principles, it is clear that 
they are far from sufficient in order for the scientist 
to be clearly and transparently provided with advice 
from physics about whether to build “a plow, an 
airplane or an atomic bomb” 11. Therefore, acknowl-
edging that the scientist is influenced by a number 
of factors – not only from their professional sphere 
but also from their personal sphere – in proposing 
“new professional ethics”, Popper states that the 
first principle should be an acknowledgment that 
there is no authority, since our conjectural and ob-
jective knowledge exceeds, more and more, what 
one person can master 12.
The second point addresses the “problem of 
induction”, where universal empirical statements 
are logically prevented from being declared true, 
independently of the quantity and quality of confir-
matory evidence. The expression “scientific truth” 
completely loses the meaning of its existence, since 
the successes from the “trial, error and successes 
method” do not guarantee the timelessness of a cer-
tain scientific theory. One cannot abstract the time 
factor from any element of scientific knowledge, 
however solid it might initially appear, even if it re-
mains irrefutable for decades or even for centuries. 
The case of Newtonian physics, still applied 
today in numerous situations even though it has 
been overtaken by Einsteinian physics, is a good 
example of how a high degree of empirical solidity 
is not enough for a scientific theory to be declared 
true. The lay conception that scientific theories are 
hypotheses that have been confirmed by experi-
mentation strictly adjusted to a virtually infallible 
methodology is to be replaced by a medley of hy-
potheses and scientific theories. What we accept 
today as scientific theories are actually conjectures, 
hypotheses, assumptions and possibilities which 
until now have remained worthy of consideration 
in the scientific sphere – but there is no guarantee 
such worthiness will endure in the future.
The next point to emerge concerns the origin 
of scientific theories and their impact on scientific 
progress. According to Popper, pure and impartial 
sensory perceptions are not in the basis of scien-
tific theories, so the “bucket theory of the mind” is 
discarded. The data must not be worshipped on the 
altar of science because they are not the basis nor 
the guarantee for the theories: they are no more re-
liable than any of our theories or ‘biases’, but much 
less, if anything 13. This role of basis to the science 
is performed by problems the scientific community 
regards as important and theories the scientific com-
munity not only formulates in speculative fashion 
but also sometimes defends in a dogmatic way, ig-
noring occasional empirical refutations, as indicated 
by the “spotlight theory”. 
Naturally, at each one of these stages – the 
prioritization of problems to be solved, the formula-
tion of scientific theories to be tested, the dogmatic 
defense of certain theories – there are countless 
opportunities for idiosyncrasies to influence the 
scientist’s thoughts and actions. Popper himself de-
clares that nothing is ever accomplished without a 
dose of passion 14, acknowledging the partiality and 
subjectivity of men of science who allow themselves 
to be guided by fears, necessities and preferences. 
By affirming that the objectivity and rationality of 
all scientists hinder the scientific process, prece-
dents are created so that the very idea of scientific 
neutrality, and consequently scientific autonomy, is 
called into question.
It is noteworthy that even though science 
could surely be considered neutral and autonomous, 
it would be inconsistent to automatically attach 
such adjectives to individual scientists or organized 
research groups. Their activities should be subjected 
to thorough examinations of an ethical nature in or-
der to minimize the risk of abuses committed in the 
name of science. In this sense the epistemologist 
argues that scientific rationality and objectivity do 
not depend on the personal rationality and objec-
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field. Instead they emerge from the social aspect of 
the scientific method, more specifically through the 
tradition of critical review which drives scientists to-
wards leaning through the detection of errors.
Would this argument be enough for science to 
be considered rational and objective? Undoubtedly 
the intersubjectivity of scientific method is able to 
make a positive contribution to the rationality and 
objectivity of science. However, such a contribution 
is not absolute, not being able to exhaust all pos-
sibilities for eliminating irrational and subjective 
influences.
Such a scenario would not only compromise 
the rationality and objectivity of science but also 
compromise the convergent conception of scientific 
rationality and objectivity. As Popper realized, the 
emergent conflict in the scientific dynamic between 
the feature of science developing in a path-depen-
dent way and the final convergence tendency might 
only be partially resolved by looking into the matter 
of rational critical review as responsible for enabling 
the approach to one truth, having also overcome 
the restrictions imposed by the debate regarding in-
commensurability, or by the “myth of the context”.
Considering that the scientist is involved in an 
undertaking which minds more the doxa than the 
epistēmē – making it impossible to guarantee the 
veracity of the knowledge regarded as the refer-
ence point – when their considerations are being 
applied, especially when such considerations con-
flict with recommendations from other sections 
of society, it should not be the case that greater 
weight is attached, a priori, to the scientist’s feed-
back than to that of the non-scientist. At this point 
it should be made clear that the “principle of ob-
jectivity of basic statements”, valid to all sciences, 
does not necessarily imply the denial or refutation 
of statements which are not intersubjectively test-
able. Such statements must be ignored by science, 
in the sense that science is intrinsically limited to its 
ability of evaluation outside the empirical sphere 15. 
Therefore, certain lines of thought in psychology 
or theology, for example, are not necessarily false 
just because they have not been submitted to the 
mechanisms of intersubjective tests.
Kuhnian propositions
Science is not the only activity the practitioners of 
which can be grouped into communities, but it is the 
only one in which each community is its own exclusi-
ve audience and judge 16.
As was done with Popper, we will now analyze 
Kuhn’s contributions, starting with those currently 
considered to be under the ambit of bioethics and 
extrapolating them from their initial context so they 
can interact with contemporary bioethical concerns.
Let us begin, then, with the existing relation be-
tween the facts as they are laid out by the world and 
the beliefs inhabiting our cognition concerning this 
world. According to Kuhn, the incommensurability 
which is perceived when two paradigms separat-
ed from each other in their timeline are analyzed 
attests to the nonexistence of a neutral empirical 
language system or concept system 17. In this situa-
tion we come across a significant limitation of our 
abilities to analyze a data set. 
In the universe of all possible and imagin-
able paradigms, we are consequently restricted by 
the incommensurability to only access the set of 
paradigms our scientific lexicon allows us. We are 
rational beings gifted with a “vision through a par-
adigm”, as if something that could be considered a 
kind of paradigm was an indispensable requisite to 
perception, as if what we see were in a way a prod-
uct of our previous visual-conceptual experience 18.
On this topic there is still room for a detail that 
makes the fact-belief relationship even more com-
plex: the individual nature of the vision through a 
paradigm. The stimulus-sensation correlation, due 
to the neural process that happens when a stim-
ulus to the perception of sensation is received, is 
neither absolutely linear nor independent from the 
previous education of each researcher. It is perfect-
ly conceivable that two scientists who perform an 
identical experiment see different things, or see 
the same thing differently, receiving different data 
and processing different stimuli 19. It is interesting to 
note that this reflection already appeared in Kuhn’s 
first texts, in the 1940s, when it was concluded that 
the conditions of cause and effect actually result 
from constructions of deterministic mathematical 
formulas responsible for the causal connection of 
events 20,21.
Add to that a direct implication of incommen-
surability, which equally impacts on the belief that 
science, throughout its progress, is moving ever 
closer to the truth as realized by tradition in the 
philosophy of science, meaning something which 
corresponds to what is real, to the outside world, 
independently from the mind. When the designa-
tion of “truth” is applied to a theory, in an internal 
and restricted way, there is no reason for unrest or 
discomfort. In fact, as a general rule, practically all 
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consequences of a theory. Conclusions that remain 
unshaken throughout experiments will be held to be 
correct, the ones that don’t fit will be held as wrong, 
and there may still be a third group of consequences 
which would encompass those conclusions which 
haven’t been properly tested. 
Nonetheless, when substituting the compar-
ison among consequences of the same theory for 
the comparison among distinct theories called to 
offer an organized vision of the same group of natu-
ral phenomena, the use of the “truth” label must be 
more parsimonious. Previous theories are no longer 
a consensus for being considered false in the light of 
a more recent theory, even though they were once 
held to be true 22. Kuhn uses the expression tran-
siency of treasured scientific beliefs to call attention 
to the fact that there were no means to prove that 
a certain paradigm is final and that the progress of 
science takes place with recurrent destructions and 
substitutions of concepts 23-25. For these situations, 
the discourse on truth takes on an implicit tone 
of temporariness, of provisionality. Seen this way, 
the incommensurability not only compromises the 
assumption that the process of choosing among 
theories takes place rationally, but also compromis-
es the assumption that changes in scientific theories 
occur in a progressive way 26.
Besides the matter of incommensurability one 
must also consider what the literature refers to as a 
“negotiation process” through which the dominant 
consensus is established. In a negotiation there is a 
choice between scientific facts which are relevant to 
the extraction of conclusions (factual aspect), as well 
as a choice between the conclusions themselves (in-
terpretative aspect). Considering that both factual 
and interpretative aspects of the negotiation pro-
cess are simultaneous, one can naturally identify a 
circularity: at the same time that the facts influence 
the conclusions drawn from them, so too do the 
conclusions influence the description of the facts 27. 
And here again there is a detail that makes 
the matter more complex: the influence of mere bi-
ographical matters in the negotiation process. The 
divergences among the conclusions of participants 
in the negotiation can ultimately be attributed to 
the differences in individual history, research fields 
and personal interest: Interests, politics, power and 
authority perform, without a doubt, a significant 
role in scientific life and its development 28.
In spite of the fact that at the intra-paradigm 
level the methodological rules are extensively shared 
by the members of a scientific community – a result 
of the dogmatic way of knowledge transmission to 
learning scientists – when considering inter-par-
adigm matters, methodological rules turn into 
epistemic values 29. Kuhn does not actually complete-
ly compromise the role performed by objectivity in 
science, but only a particular philosophical image of 
scientific objectivity, through the relocation of the 
criterion of objectivity and truth in the context of 
scientific practice 30. Consequently, the use of such 
epistemic values in certain contexts may happen in 
a significantly divergent way, this divergence being 
the result of the different importance given to values 
which are sometimes mutually conflicting. 
Consistency, empirical adequacy, simplici-
ty, explanatory power, predictive power, inter alia, 
are criteria which might be valued differently by 
different scientists, for there are no a priori hierar-
chies. This means that parallel to the consideration 
of epistemic values there is also the consideration 
of non-epistemic values through the influence of 
idiosyncratic factors dependent upon individual 
biographies and particular personality traits. The 
corollary is that every individual choice between 
competing theories depends on a mixture of ob-
jective and subjective factors, or on shared and 
individual criteria 31. To expatiate upon the process 
through which a dominant paradigm is achieved, let 
us make clear that:
no paradigm which has emerged from possibilities 
worthy of consideration by the scientific communi-
ty has been able to offer a plausible solution to the 
absolute totality of the problems the world presents; 
and
competing paradigms do not have identical limita-
tions when it comes to offering plausible solutions to 
the problems the world presents.
Therefore the negotiation process might be 
considered as the prioritization of problems that 
should not remain among those lacking plausible 
solutions. Naturally, it is in this situation that the 
“totally external to science criteria” will gain crucial 
importance to the revolutionary quality in debates 
among paradigms 32.
Feyerabendian propositions
Western civilization as a whole now values efficiency 
to an extent that occasionally makes ethical objec-
tions seem ‘naïve’ and ‘unscientific’. There are many 
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A well-known critic of the practice of acquiring 
knowledge through scientific activity, Feyerabend, 
through his reflections on the philosophy of science, 
presents us with a new thinking regarding the mo-
dalities of political-administrative practices in the 
scientific ambit. Let us therefore move on to his 
impact on bioethical debates, looking at his epis-
temology regarding fundamental assumptions of 
science and extracting consequences for the ethical 
management of the science and technology system.
The prominence achieved by Feyerabend 
probably derives from his defense of the thesis that 
science does not currently possess the quality of 
uniformity (and nor did it in the past). His studies 
revealed that science does not have just one vision 
of the world but instead exhibits a variety of ten-
dencies and research philosophies. In one corner, 
there would be the “Aristotelian line”, represented 
by scientists concerned with avoiding exaggerated 
speculations and restricting themselves to the facts, 
with experimental designs unequivocally indicating 
one hypothesis among conflicting ones. In the op-
posite corner, there would be the “Platonic line”, 
whose representatives feel encouraged to speculate 
and propose theories that interact with the facts in 
an indirect and highly complex way 34. However, in 
spite of the immeasurable diversity of world views 
in science, and a similar diversity of metaphysical 
bases, a significant portion of these views are em-
pirically acceptable 35. In fact, his historical research 
towards a characterization of the scientific method 
made him ubiquitously known as the proponent of 
the “anything goes” principle.
Feyerabend thus comes to defend the idea 
that if scientists’ activities were strictly oriented 
by methodologies in accordance with the ideas of 
objectivity – which emerges when a nation, a tribe 
or a civilization identifies its way of life with the 
laws of the universe (physical or moral), and which 
becomes apparent when cultures with different 
objective views come into confrontation 36 – and 
reason – which has its origins in the assumption that 
there are standards for knowledge and standards for 
actions that are universally valid 37 – the knowledge 
we have today regarding nature simply would not 
have been achieved. Paradigmatic events in the his-
tory of science, admired not only by scientists but 
also philosophers and laymen (for example Galileo 
Galilei’s contributions), should not be seen as having 
been driven by objectivity or reason.
In this sense, the first step towards the conse-
quences of the reflection in the philosophy of science 
regarding the ethics in science and technology is to 
disassociate scientific endeavor from the image of a 
neutral initiative from a moral standpoint. The fact 
that science is devoid of rational and objective meth-
odology, and guided by evidence which is subject to 
historical and physiological influences 38, invalidates 
the belief that only epistemic values (such as con-
sistency, empirical adequacy, simplicity, explanatory 
power and predictive power) influence the final re-
sult of the process of generating knowledge.
Another equally important step is to come 
to see scientific endeavor as an instrument (more 
important in some areas, less in others) which 
guides and/or enables the unraveling of the most 
diverse practical disorders, instead of approaching 
an ultimate truth. The incommensurability thesis 
questions the rationality, which supposedly guides 
the process of choosing between divergent scientific 
theories, and also questions the supposed progres-
sive feature when it comes to succession between 
scientific theories 39. Furthermore, scientific results, 
being predictable only when properly inserted in an 
experimental arrangement, provide to knowledge a 
feature, which is fundamentally contextual and spe-
cific to certain situations 40.
Given that science is dependent upon the en-
vironment in which it is conceived and developed, 
by linguistic influences 41; devoid of standard au-
to-correction mechanisms 42 and standardization of 
progress 43; and equipped with mutually exclusive 
theories, which coexist having the same empirical 
basis or demonstrating incommensurability char-
acteristics 44, it is not in tune with the convergent 
conception of epistemic rationality. There is no 
way that specialists immersed in different cultures 
although fit to develop, without limitation whatso-
ever, the ability to know the world, will coincidently 
arrive at the exact same belief regarding the world 
by the end of their journeys.
Besides, specialists’ abilities do not exempt 
them from criticism: they do not possess all the 
knowledge concerning a specific phenomenon but 
instead only that of a specific field; and indeed 
usually dedicate themselves to the study of only 
a limited group of characteristics of that field, in 
accordance with their own personal interests 45. 
Because they are an interested party – wanting a 
respectable position, a good salary and continued 
funding for their particular line of scientific inves-
tigation – wider society should not be exclusively 
subject to automatically accept whatever specialists 
indicate as being the right path to follow. Indeed, 
the generation of consensus in the scientific envi-
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that precede the conclusion of political deals, not to 
mention other factors in the realm of economic and 
national interests 46.
Science therefore ceases to have a special sta-
tus; it is an undertaking marked by successes and 
failures, consisting of distinct approaches that only 
sometimes achieve the final result that was expect-
ed and fervently desired 47. The most important 
point is that science, as Feyerabend had warned, 
is revealed as being incapable of disregarding what 
happens outside its borders. In this way, science will 
come to be seen as one among several traditions for 
attaining knowledge of reality, which contribute to 
society moving closer to achieving its aspirations. 
So science will not have any special privilege 
bestowed on it, for nothing entitles a society or even 
a scientific community to consider itself superior to 
any other tradition. Every different tradition may 
then enjoy equal rights of acknowledgement of their 
values and contributions, as well as corresponding 
access to those agencies that make political deci-
sions. This new proposed definition of a free society 
differs from the usual definition, in which a free so-
ciety is one where its individuals enjoy equal rights 
to access positions that were previously defined and 
restricted by a particular tradition, such as Western 
science and rationalism 48.
Discussion
Almost 40 years ago, Jonas alerted us to the 
fact that we should concern ourselves with inves-
tigating the close relation between theory and 
practice in the way science was being conducted, 
and essentially in how it should be conducted: We 
shall then see that not only have the boundaries be-
tween theory and practice become blurred, but that 
the two are now fused in the very heart of science it-
self, so that the ancient alibi of pure theory and with 
it the moral immunity it provided no longer hold 49. 
This warning of the loss of the alibi which granted 
science moral immunity refers us to the question 
about whose task it is to evaluate the morality of 
the various possibilities of scientific activities.
So far we have learned that scientists do not 
possess intrinsic authority, seeing that the presup-
positions of scientific neutrality and convergency in 
epistemic rationality have been made contestable 
by studies in the philosophy of science. It may be 
timely to note that even if scientific endeavor were 
to grant its actors/representatives intrinsic authority 
– that is, if we could imagine even for a moment a 
hypothetical epistemic scenario in which the presup-
positions of scientific neutrality and the convergency 
in epistemic rationality were undisputed, irrefutable 
and valid ad eternum – the management of science 
and technology, or even the government of a soci-
ety, should still not be exclusively centralized in the 
hands of scientists, as if they were platonic tutors:
Empiric evidences are important and necessary, ne-
ver sufficient. When deciding how much to sacrifice 
to attain a goal, goods or an objective in order to 
achieve a certain amount of another, we necessarily 
surpass anything that strictly scientific knowledge 
may provide 50. 
Beyond the argument about the insufficien-
cy of scientific knowledge – considering intrinsic 
and extrinsic limitations – there are also other ar-
guments that could be invoked in support of the 
participation of society in the management of tech-
noscience. A recurrent argument regards the origin 
of resources. Considering that the financing of scien-
tific research and technological development comes 
mainly from public funds, which is to say taxes col-
lected from the general population, nothing would 
be more just than enabling the citizen to participate 
in the process of decision-making concerning the 
allocation of resources in technosciences. If the citi-
zen is paying, let them also give their opinion about 
the benefits that will be sought and also about the 
harm that occasionally (considering risk analysis) 
will be done. If there is some kind of “joint sharing” 
of costs concerning investment, let there also be a 
joint sharing of possible positive results arising from 
the research.
Naturally, from the point of view of the dem-
ocratic management of science and technology, it 
would be unacceptable to allow social participation 
only when we were strictly dealing with public in-
vestments. Even though the cost of investments is 
not shared – and even though we are taking into ac-
count research projects that are privately financed 
– the positive or negative impacts of the great 
majority of technoscientific systems (particularly, 
biotechnoscientific systems) are invariably felt by 
more than one social group. Furthermore, what to 
one group of people might appear to be the positive 
impact of a particular research activity could actual-
ly be negative for another group. For example, the 
conception of a new Genetically Modified Organism 
might increase the productivity of a certain crop, 
boosting a famer’s profits, but at the same time con-
taminate the organic crops of neighboring farmers, 
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mind all the reflection symbolically represented by 
Bacon’s quote: “ipsa scientia potestas est”.
Perhaps the most important argument, how-
ever, concerns the potential gains arising from public 
involvement in the management of technoscience. 
The consideration upon the desirability of strictly 
objective evaluations (if indeed they are possible) 
indicates that the subjectivity might be capable of 
contributing to the evaluation by plural committees, 
so as to eventually achieve more satisfactory results. 
Although the participation of laymen adds cer-
tain financial costs to the decision-making process, 
scientific knowledge, as relevant as it may be con-
sidered, remains instrumental. Its relevance derives 
from its significant contribution to solving the most 
diverse problems, but from a moral standpoint it 
remains an instrument which should be used only 
in appropriate circumstances. Of equal importance 
to instrumental knowledge is speculative knowl-
edge, which makes significant contributions to our 
understanding of the moral scenario, so that social 
participation will give the decision-making process 
a real chance of maximizing the desirable benefits 
and minimizing the undesirable risks.
It is virtually a moral necessity for there to be 
close cooperation between technoscientists and 
laymen whose communities the technoscientists 
wish to study, change or improve. This is not the 
naive proposition of replacing scientific autonomy 
with a social heteronomy in science. A vast array 
of decisions concerning technoscientific activities 
would remain in the sphere of autoregulation, such 
as the development of approved projects or the 
discussions regarding theories and their different 
degrees of corroboration. However, some of the 
decisions would take into account the position of 
not only technoscientists but also of laymen in tech-
noscience – for example as to whether it would be 
acceptable to submit a community to certain risks 
(some known, some unknown) so as to possibly 
achieve a certain benefit. 
Moving beyond the previous reflections in 
the philosophy of science, we get to the point of 
promoting an inversion of the roles performed by 
scientific truth and by ethics, at least in specific 
situations. Reflecting upon Molina and Rowland’s 
research on chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) for which 
they received the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1995, 
Olivé reaches the conclusion that scientific knowl-
edge is capable of implying a moral responsibility, 
which is to say that in certain circumstances, having 
certain rationally-based beliefs or objective knowl-
edge automatically obliges the scientist to choose 
between two or more possible courses of action 51. 
However, truth as declared by science does not al-
ways influence the nature of ethics – in certain cases 
the situation is exactly the opposite: Ethics, with all 
its weights and propositions, influences the very na-
ture of truth. 
At the same time, moral conflicts often lie at 
the heart of the most diverse dissensions, instead of 
being the solution. And the previous consensus re-
garding ethics in technoscientific initiatives, having 
been established by the widest possible participa-
tion from various sectors of society, would create 
the most favorable conditions for technoscientific 
development in harmony with the wishes of a given 
community.
Final considerations
The study of the fundamental assumptions of 
techno-science, as reflected by the philosophy of 
science, unequivocally reveals the indispensability 
of social participation in decision-making process-
es regarding techno-scientific undertakings. When 
the assumptions about scientific neutrality and the 
convergence on epistemic rationality – which form 
the legitimating basis of epistemic authoritarian-
ism – were contested, the inadequacy of scientific 
knowledge for justifying political decisions was re-
vealed. For the management of the techno-scientific 
system to be considered bioethical, the involvement 
of the communities affected by technological devel-
opments is indispensable.
This article does not aim to combat science. It 
would be utterly unrealistic to call for a moratori-
um on investments in science and technology. The 
increase in human life expectancy, for example, is 
sufficient to demonstrate the value of scientific and 
technological advances. However, one cannot lose 
sight of the fact that increasingly lethal biological 
weapons can be produced through exactly the same 
techniques for manipulating living organisms that 
also allow the development of vaccines and medica-
tions. And it is not simply a question of distinguishing 
between potentially beneficial and potentially ma-
leficent research. Reality is not as simple as that. 
Benefits and detriments often overlap in a complex 
way; benefits are immense and clear but detriments 
are sometimes even bigger, and unpredictable. 
A very good example of this (and also epis-
temic authoritarianism, including clear cases of the 
suppression of scientific dissonance) is the “still hy-
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(HIV) originating from the initial research towards 
the development of an oral vaccine to stop polio 52. 
After World War II, when polio was considered one 
of the worst public health problems, three great 
scientists became involved with research towards 
mass immunization: Jonas Salk, Albert Sabin and 
Hilary Koprowski. According to this “still hypoth-
esis” (“still” because it has not yet been properly 
scrutinized), at least one type of Simian Immunode-
ficiency Virus was introduced in humans during the 
first mass vaccination campaigns which took place 
between 1957 and 1959 in Central Africa, giving rise 
to HIV-1. 
This article does not aim to overvalue the 
extreme opposite of the current situation. Techno-sci-
entists should be considered irreplaceable, since 
they possess the instrumental knowledge necessary 
so that the decision-making process is grounded in 
the most updated and precise information available, 
in the vanguard of techno-scientific knowledge, 
on the very border between what is known and 
what is unknown. Nonetheless, the debates in the 
philosophy of science that dealt particularly with sci-
entific neutrality and the convergence on epistemic 
rationality offer significant arguments with which 
to contest these conceptions, calling into question 
the adequacy of techno-scientific knowledge to le-
gitimize and justify decisions in the ambit of science 
and technology.
This article wishes, therefore, to take issue 
with the current modus operandi, which is charac-
terized by a kind of collective paternalism because 
the techno-scientific community, without the di-
rect involvement of wider society, promotes its 
own regulation. Once scientific neutrality and the 
convergence on epistemic rationality are contest-
ed, however, scientific autonomy should cease to 
be total, and instead of techno-scientific autoregu-
lation there should be bioethics heteroregulation. 
Scientific paternalism should be replaced by a sys-
tem of collective autonomy in which various actors 
participate in the management and influence the 
decision-making process.
Even if at some point in the future those ar-
guments in the philosophy of science that have 
contested scientific neutrality and convergence on 
epistemic rationality come to be refuted, even if 
the scientists performing their research and devel-
opment activities come to be considered neutral, 
objective and rational, techno-scientific paternalism 
would still not be acceptable. The reasons would be 
the same ones which, as a general rule, condemn 
paternalism in other contexts, such as the fact that 
the direct and indirect consequences of scientific 
undertakings are not restricted to the techno-scien-
tific community but can in fact affect the whole of 
society.
Scientific endeavor has been a fantastic instru-
ment for the advancement of human knowledge. 
And if we want science to remain so, it is impera-
tive that it conducts a more vigorous dialogue with 
other forms of knowledge acquisition. The defend-
ers of epistemic authoritarianism and scientism 
actually perform a disservice to the scientific and 
technological system itself. Debates in the philoso-
phy of science have uncovered not only the limits 
of scientific endeavor that compromise the credi-
bility of scientific and authoritarian views, but have 
also indicated a strategy that might make scientific 
and technological successes more frequent. Such a 
strategy would consist of abandoning the monopoly 
of convictions and instead cooperating closely with 
other forms of knowledge. 
To say it as clearly as possible: there is no less 
scientific attitude than asserting that science is the 
only possible and imaginable way to explore the 
unknown and to reveal genuine knowledge. Sci-
ence must be made more humane, in the sense of 
allowing subjectivity to influence with transparency 
and positivity the attempts of objective expressions. 
Epistemic values, instead of having a veiled role, 
must be considered with clarity.
And in this process of the humanization of 
science, the influence of science and technology de-
velopment policies cannot be ignored. Government 
science and technology policies currently have a 
significant influence on scientific and technological 
development. Planning the allocation of financial 
resources – deciding which fields will receive big-
ger and longer-term investments, which will receive 
scarce and only short-term funding, and which will 
be overlooked entirely – is a fundamental stage in 
elaborating a list of goals, benefits to be enjoyed, 
and negative effects to be tolerated. From this aris-
es the need to share with society the mandate, and 
equally the responsibilities, of designing science and 
technology development policies. 
And there are no reasons to be afraid. In the 
management of countries’ science and technology 
systems there is a world of riches to be gained from 
cooperation between the philosophy of science and 
bioethics, as well as from accepting the indispens-
ability of investing in new research at the interface 
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